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A physicalist account of multiple realizability in the special sciences 
Meir Hemmo1 and Orly Shenker2 
 
This is the text of a talk given in the PSA2016 meeting in Atlanta. For this reason 
there are no references in it.  
 
One of the main achievements of analytic philosophy in the 20th century is the 
formulation and defense of the thesis called non-reductive physicalism (in various 
versions). This project is central to the work of Putnam, Davidson, Fodor and to some 
extent Lewis, and many others. Non reductive physicalism is considered to be a major 
achievement in analytic philosophy precisely because it seems to many that – on the 
one hand – it says that everything is fundamentally physical, while claiming – on the 
other hand – that there are high-level facts in the world that are not reducible to the 
fundamental facts of physics, and consequently there are high-level laws in the special 
sciences that are genuinely autonomous from the laws of physics. The thesis of 
multiple realizability is central to these ideas. One of the prevalent arguments in 
support of multiple realization is empirical.  
 
In their recent book, Polger and Shapiro examine in detail various case studies of 
alleged multiple realization and show very convincingly that – as a matter of fact – 
the empirical evidence is not conclusive. Their conclusion is that multiple realization 
is not as wide-spread as some people tend to think. However, they do not reject the 
idea that multiple realizability is a genuine logical possibility. We join Polger and 
Shapiro in this conclusion. However, I will argue here on a priori grounds that 
multiple realizability is incompatible with physicalism, because it entails what we call 
token dualism. We shall explain below in detail this implication and how it comes 
about.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows: I will first put forward a type-type identity theory, 
I will defend it, and then I will argue for the following two points.  
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1. Multiple realizability is incompatible with physicalism. This holds even if high-
level kinds supervene on the lower-level physical kinds. 
 
2. A type-identity physicalist theory can explain away multiple realization in the 
special sciences in all cases where multiple realization seems to hold. 	  
I need to put forward some conceptual tools taken from the foundations of physics 
concerning the way in which fundamental physics accounts for natural kinds in some 
special sciences. I will focus here on the high-level kind ‘temperature’ in 
thermodynamics and statistical physics. This will set the stage for understanding in 
terms of our best theories of physics what is genuine multiple realizability and what it 
implies.  
 
According to our best physical theory (for example, classical mechanics or quantum 
mechanics or quantum field theory) the world at any given time has a complete state. 
This state is given (metaphysically speaking) by what is called the ‘microscopic state’ 
(or for short ‘microstate’). The microstate of the world (or of any subsystem of it) is 
considered to be the complete and exhaustive state of the world at a given time 
without remainder. In other contexts, the term ‘microstate’ sometimes means small or 
part of a whole. This is not the intended meaning here. Here – I repeat – the term 
microstate denotes the complete physical state of the world at a time which means that 
given this state there is no further information that one can add in order to describe in 
more detail or more accurately the physics of the world. We can now understand the 
physicalist thesis as follows: every token microstate of the world is strictly and wholly 
physical.  
 
Now suppose that we wish to say something about the world, in some high-level 
special science, say biology, which seems not to be captured by the world’s physical 
microstate, but nonetheless we want it to be compatible with the physicalist thesis. 
The only compatible thing we can say, which will be informative and nonetheless not 
repetitive, is say much less, that is say something about an aspect of the complete 
microstate, which is given by some partial description of it and compare it to aspects 
of other possible microstates.  
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The special science of thermodynamics is understood in physics precisely in this way. 
Temperature of an ideal gas in equilibrium, for example, is identical to – a certain 
aspect of the microstate of the gas, namely the average kinetic energy of the particles 
that make up the gas. So temperature is not some high-level fact over and above the 
microstate of an ideal gas in equilibrium, but rather it is just the average kinetic 
energy of the particles that make up the gas. This is an aspect of the gas’s microstate 
which may be common to other possible microstates. That is, temperature is the 
understanding of temperature in the Boltzmann approach to statistical mechanics. 
What we have here is a cross-level identity theory in terms of partial aspects of 
microstates. These aspects are called macrovariables or macrostates in statistical 
physics, and the regularities they turn out to exhibit just are the laws of 
thermodynamics.  
 
Despite this identity theory, the high-level laws of thermodynamics are radically 
different from the laws of the low-level mechanics (laws such as F=ma or the 
Schroedinger equation in QM). For example, the laws of thermodynamics are not 
time-symmetric (i.e. they are not invariant under the reversal of the direction of time), 
despite the fact that the fundamental laws of mechanics are time-symmetric, and that 
all there is in the world is the time-symmetric evolution of microstates! The explicit 
target of statistical mechanics is to reduce by means of cross level identities the 
entirety of thermodynamics to mechanics and nonetheless obtain the thermodynamic 
time-asymmetric laws from the time-symmetric laws of fundamental mechanics. We 
set aside here the question of whether this target has indeed been already achieved. 
What I wish to stress here is that thermodynamics is understood by this reductive 
approach as a case of a special science. And what I wish to do here is advance this 
reductive approach to all the special sciences. If one wishes to construct a theory of 
any special science that is compatible with the universal imperialism of fundamental 
physics -- as just explained -- there is simply no other way. 
 
Let us stress the nature of the identity theory that comes out from this discussion. 
We are talking about a cross level identity theory, in which a high-level kind is 
identified with a macrovariable or an aspect of the token low-level microstate where 
this macrovariable is a fact pertaining to each and every token-microstate. For 
example, the high-level thermodynamic kind, that is the macrovariable of 
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temperature, is a fact pertaining to each and every individual token-microstate of the 
world. This fact is not picked out by the entire microstate, but only by an aspect of it. 
This aspect then explains the partition of the tokens into the kinds by the fact that this 
aspect is shared by all the tokens of this kind. This type-identity theory is suggested 
by statistical physics (according to our understanding of it) and we propose to 
generalize it to all the special sciences. I am not sure whether this is the standard way 
of thinking about the identity theory in the literature. If not, this identity theory is 
new.   
 
This identity theory has the following consequence. Often in the literature it is argued 
that since there are many different microstates that may realize the same temperature, 
we have here a genuine case in physics of multiple realization. But this is a mistake! It 
presupposes that temperature is realized by the entire microstate of the gas, and this 
assumption is not entailed by physics! Temperature is identified with an aspect of the 
microstate of the gas and not with the full microstate. And since all the microstates 
that realize the same temperature share the same aspect, we say that there is no 
multiple realization in statistical mechanics.  
 
Let us now turn to multiple realizability. A set of microstates is said to (genuinely) 
multiply realize a special science kind just in case the microstates in the set that 
realize this kind are heterogeneous. By heterogeneous I mean that the microstates 
don’t share any aspect or macrovariable that can be identified with the special 
science kind. The crucial point here is the heterogeneity: Multiple realization holds if 
and only if there is no shared aspect according to our identity theory. 
 
I will now argue that if multiple realization holds the high-level facts must be new 
primitive facts which are not physical. To see why consider the following argument. 
Suppose that God created the world by creating a collection of token-microstates A, B 
and C, each of which is wholly physical, without remainder. Suppose also that 
together with the microstates God created the laws of fundamental physics. Is this 
enough in order to yield the world as we know it, in particular is this enough to give 
the special sciences high-level kinds? Suppose also that the partition to the special 
sciences kinds is such that the high-level kind P supervenes on the low-level physical 
tokens A and B. And finally suppose that the token C is not P. If God’s creation of the 
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tokens and the laws is enough to fix this partition, then it must be the case that the 
partition is based on shared physical macrovariables, essentially along the lines of 
statistical physics. This is the type identity physicalism we have in mind.  
 
We stress that if the partition to the high-level kinds is brought about by the laws of 
physics so that the laws of physics make it the case that A and B are P and C is not P, 
this means that the partition to the high-level kinds is based on shared macrovariables. 
If this is God’s world, it isn’t a world in which multiple realization holds.  
 
Suppose now that multiple realization holds, so that A, B and C are physically 
heterogeneous. If this is true, it means that the laws of physics don’t make it the case 
in terms of macrovariables and supervenience that A and B are P and C isn’t. And so 
in order to create a world in which multiple realization holds, God had to make 
another creation over and above the creation of the tokens and the laws which will 
make it the case that A and B are P and C isn’t. That is, God must in this case add the 
partition of the tokens into the high-level kinds as another fact, which is not dictated 
by the physics of the tokens! And this must be a new unphysical fact built into each 
and every token, namely the fact that fixes or determines to which kind the token 
belongs. I stress that this holds even though we have assumed supervenience! This is 
token dualism! 
 
Of course we don’t take the God fairy-tale seriously. But the serious point in this 
story is this: According to physics all there is in the world is the world’s token-
microstate. If multiple realization holds, the physics of the token-microstate is not 
enough to determine the partition to sets! And so regardless of supervenience it 
cannot be the case that each token is wholly and only physical. But this means that 
there is a fact about a token, which is not physical. And it is this non-physical fact 
about the token, which determines whether or not the token belongs to any special 
science kind. Finally: This means that supervenience does not secure the minimal 
physicalist idea -- that the physics of a token determines -- or grounds or fixes -- the 
token’s high level behavior.  
 
There are in the literature ways of talking about the type=token relation other than 
realization, such as grounding and constitution. Our conclusion holds with respect to 
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all of these ways, as long as the partition of the high-level kinds is not given in terms 
of shared macrovariables and the laws of physics. 
 
In the literature the high-level kinds are sometimes thought of in terms of functional 
kinds (computational or causal functions). If the function and the functional role of 
tokens are determined by the laws of physics, functionalism is a special case of type-
identity. But if the laws of physics don’t determine the functions and the functional 
role of tokens, then there is an extra non-physical fact at play here, and exactly as 
before this implies token dualism.    
 
Some non-reductive physicalists say that “God knows” what it is that partitions the 
tokens into the sets (as Fodor says). By this they mean presumably that this partition 
is a brute fact. The point here seems to be that if the partition is a brute fact, then it is 
not dictated by the tokens, and therefore the tokens can be wholly physical. But this is 
wrong, since, as we saw, the brute fact is an additional fact over and above the tokens 
and the laws of physics, and this means that even God cannot base the partition to the 
high-level kinds wholly and only on the physics of the tokens. 
 
We conclude that if the world is completely physical, the fact that determines to 
which high-level kinds (or sets) the token belongs must be a physical fact encoded in 
the token. Since non-reductive physicalism rejects this conclusion, by accepting 
multiple realization, it collapses into token dualism! And by now it is immaterial 
whether the dualism in question is property or substance. By this we have proved the 
first point of the paper. 
 
Let’s now turn to the second claim that the appearance of multiple realization (if 
there is such an appearance) in the special sciences can be explained by our type-
identity theory. Our treatment here equally applies to both classical and quantum 
mechanics and is compatible with low-level physical laws that are deterministic or 
stochastic. 
 
The set up is such that we have a straightforward physical interaction between a 
system (to which we ascribe some high-level behavior) and a device (which could 
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ultimately be the observer). The interactions bring about the following time 
evolutions:  
 
 (1) READY_d * A_s à X_P_d * A_s 
(2) READY_d * B_s à X_P_d * B_s 
 
Here the interactions are written in terms of microstates. In both time evolutions we 
assume that the device begins in the same READY microstate and ends up either in 
the same microstate P, or more generally, in two different final microstates that have 
the shared macrovariable P. The microstates A and B of the system in the two 
evolutions are heterogeneous. Since the device ends up in both evolutions in the same 
macrovariable P, we mistakenly interpret the interactions as if they are measurements 
of the macrovariable P indicated by the device. And since A and B are heterogeneous 
here, we mistakenly suppose that the high-level kind P pertains to the system. And 
this is why we think that P is multiply realized by A and B. But nothing of this sort 
happens. What does happen is that the device doesn’t really measure anything in the 
system, but arrives to its final state P because of the dynamical laws of the evolution. 
This is consistent with everything we know in fundamental physics. So we have the 
appearance of multiple realization, accounted for by physics, and explained here by 
the shared property P of the device. 
 
So in physicalism there are only two options: High-level kinds are either shared 
macrovariables of the systems or else they are shared macrovariabes of devices. It 
seems to us that multiple realization in all the special sciences can be explained in 
exactly the same way. The analysis we gave here is the only route that is compatible 
with physics. 
 
We can better understand now the notion of temperature in statistical mechanics. We 
said before that temperature of an ideal gas in equilibrium pertains just is the 
macrovariable of average kinetic energy. This is the way in which temperature is 
understood in the so-called Boltzmann approach to statistical mechanics. In the 
Gibbsian approach the account of thermodynamic macrovariables is different. It is 
given in terms of functions over the entire phase space of the system. In the standard 
understanding of the Gibbsian approach these functions are interpreted as 
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macrovariables of measuring devices, such as a thermometer accounted for by the 
dynamics of the interactions. The thermodynamic kinds on this approach are treated 
along the lines of the analysis of interactions I just gave. But in both approaches to 
statistical mechanics there is no multiple realization. 
 
So in what sense are the thermodynamic laws and kinds autonomous after all? The 
strict short answer is that they are not. From God’s eye point of view, if physicalism 
is true the fundamental low-level token and its law-like time evolution dictate 
everything. But the special sciences kinds are new physical kinds (just like 
temperature). However, from our point of view the physical macrovariables that the 
special sciences laws talk about are highly complex and inaccessible and will 
presumably remain so. It is therefore unreasonable to think that we will ever do 
without the special sciences. So, despite the fact all there is in the world are only 
physical tokens, our best attitude should be that the special sciences are autonomous 
from fundamental physics. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
1. Whether or not genuine multiple realization holds is a question of fact, but if it 
holds, physicalism is false. 
 
2. Apparent multiple realization in the special sciences can be explained away by 
type-identity physicalism.  
 
3. The special sciences are autonomous just because they are new branches of physics. 
Since the macrovariables identified with the high-level kinds need not be the kinds 
familiar from known lower-levels laws, such as the thermodynamic laws for example, 
the behavior of these new physical kinds need not have anything to do with the 
thermodynamic laws. That is, the special sciences laws may be radically different 
from the thermodynamic laws and may exhibit a behavior over time of the new 
higher-level macrovariables that need not resemble neither the fundamental 
microphysical laws nor the laws of lower-level kinds that are already known. 
 
	   9	  
4. A straightforward consequence of this type-type identity theory is that the 
distinction between high- and low-level kinds (and laws) has no ontological 
implications in the following sense. On this view, the so-called levels don’t 
correspond to levels of reality: there is only one level of reality. Instead of levels, the 
theory appeals to different degrees of abstraction and different degrees of description, 
coarse-graining etc. In this way various mysteries that arise due to the talk about  
levels, such as top-down causation, brute facts that somehow give rise to sets (“high-
level kinds”) etc., simply evaporate. By contrast, note that if one assumes multiple 
realization, then it follows (from our argument for the first point) that there are at least 
two distinct levels of reality, since multiple realization as we agued implies token 
dualism. 
 
5. Another important consequence of our analysis is that there are essentially only two 
kinds of fundamental (metaphysical) relations in nature: identity and causation 
(regardless of how one makes sense of causation). Identity replaces all sorts of non-
causal relations that have been supposed to hold across or between the so-called 
different levels, and once the high-level kinds are identified with the low-level 
macrovariables, what remains to be done is provide the causal structure of the 
macrovariables that holds at the single level of reality (and their temporal and 
functional behavior at this level). In the literature other metaphysical relations such as 
realization, grounding, constitution, etc., have been proposed in order to explain the 
way in which high-level facts arise from the fundamental matters of fact. Our type-
type identity theory provides a physical explanation of these relations. Realization, 
grounding, constitution and the like should be thought of in our picture as ways of 
describing various combinations of the two fundamental relations, namely identity 
and causation. Note that the type-type identities here between macrovariables and the 
so-called higher-level kinds are self-explanatory precisely because they are strict 
identities that need no further explanations.  
 
6. The resulting picture is parsimonious, appeals to no miracles brute facts and 
relations other than the most simple and self-explanatory ones of identity and 
causation and has quite a strong explanatory power. The picture provides a unified 
account of all the special sciences together with fundamental physics according to 
which everything is indeed physical.   
